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CHOOSING SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: A DISCUSSION OF
"CHOICE," "RIGHTS" AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIESt
April L. Cherry*
For to survive in the mouth of this dragon we call America, we have
had to learn this first and most vital lesson - that we were never
meant to survive. Not as human beings.
LoRDE, The Transformation of Silence
into Language and Action, in SISTER OUTSIDER

AUDRE

40, 42 (1984).
lNTRODUCTION

In the above quoted passage, Audre Lorde explains the impor
tance of speaking, even in the most difficult of circumstances. She has
taught us that our silence does not protect us. She has written: "Be
cause the machine will try to grind you into dust anyway, whether or
not we speak. We can sit in our corners mute forever while our sisters
and our selves are ·wasted ... ; we can sit in our safe corners mute as
bottles, and we will still be no less afraid." 1 It is in this spirit that I
offer my thoughts about the limits of choice rhetoric and rights-talk in
the context ofwomen and reproduction. For it is often noted by femi
nists that to criticize the foundation of women's reproductive rights is
to not fully comprehend the fragility ofwomen's current reproductive
rights, and to give fodder to those who wish to further restrict such

t This paper is an expanded version of the speech that Professor Cherry
presented at the National Women Law Students' Association Conference, entitled
Consensus and the Community: Diversifying Our Points of Vzew, at the University of
WISconsin Law School on March l, 1996.
Editor's No~ For Professor Cherry's complete article on this topic, see 10 Wrs.
WOMEN'S LJ. 161 (1996).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. AB., Vassar
College;J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank Lucinda Finley, Catharine Mac
Kinnon, and Harlon Dalton, who, as my teachers, saved my sanity, by being there, by
telling me and those like me that we weren't crazy, and by teaching their students that
the lives of women of all races and ethnicities, lesbians and gay men, and communi
ties of color are important, and that issues that affect our lives are integral to legal
education. Many thanks to Meg Baldwin, Beth Gammie, and Ann McGinley for their
friendship and support; M.D. Miles for her patience in listening to me read drafts of
this paper; Melanie Stewart for her excellent research; and Kim Epstein, University of
WISconsin School of Law, Class of 1996, who pulled off a wonderful conference.
I. AUDRE LoRDE, The Transfurmation ofSilence into Language and Action, in SISTER
OursmER 40, 42 (1984).
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rights. 2 I 1:Iust that silence will not save us. However, giving voice to
our values and our concerns about women's subordination will, at the
very least, do us no harm.
CHOICE RHETORIC

Often feminist discussions regarding contraceptives, sterilization,
abortion, and the newer emerging reproductive technologies, such as
artificial insemination, 3 in vitro fertilization 4 and even contract preg
nancy5 are framed around or based in the rhetoric of "choice" and
2. See, e.g., Lynn M. Paltrow, Test Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood?, 8 W0
MEN's RIGHTS RPT. 303, 306 (1985) (book review) (the critiques of sex-selective abor
tions could easily be used to support the anti-abortion movement).
3. Artificial insemination involves the introduction of fresh or formerly frozen
sperm into the uterus or vagina of a woman through the use of a catheter or "turkey
baster" in order to attempt to produce a pregnancy. The sperm has been collected
from a man who has masturbated and ejaculated and whose sperm is collected for the
purpose of artificial insemination. This type of insemination is deemed "artificial"
because it is non-coital.
4. In order to produce a pregnancy through in-vitro fertilization ("!VF"), a wo
man's ovaries are stimulated (hyper-ovulated) with powerful fertility drugs, such as
Clomid, to produce multiple ripened ova. These ova are removed from the woman's
ovaries surgically, through laparoscopy, or non-surgically, through a transvaginal re
trieval method. The American Fertility Soc'y, In-Vitro Fertilization - Embryo Transfer
(IVF-ET) in the United States IVF-ET Regi,stry: 1989 Result, 55 FERTILI'lY AND STERTII..I'lY 14,
15 (1991). A sperm "donation" is received from a man who has masturbated and
whose ejaculatory material has been collected. The ova and sperm are combined in a
petri dish. Fertilization occurs and the resulting embryos are inseminated into either
the donating woman's uterus or into the uterus of another woman. If the embryos
implant into the uterine wall of the receiving woman, then a pregnancy begins. See
generally, Lori B. Andrews and Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
623 (1991). Studies have shown that IVF results in live birth in only 10% of the cases
at the best clinic. Id. at 644; WoMEN UNDER ArrACK: V1croRIES, BACKLASH AND THE
FIGHT FoR REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, 33 (Susan E. Davis ed., 1988); see also PATRICIA
SPALLONE, BEYOND CONCEPTION: THE NEW Pounc.s OF REPRODUCTION 63 (1989) (In
1985, the live birth percentage per IVF treatment cycle was 8.5 percent.). Children
born as a result of IVF have a higher incident of severe genetic abnormalities, includ
ing spina bifida, than children born without the use of such technologies. See, e.g.,
Andrews and Douglass, supra at 649-51; see generally, GENA COREA, THE MoTIIER
MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARIFICIAL INSEMINATION To ARTIFICIAL
WOMBS (1985).
5. Contract pregnancy is also known as surrogate motherhood. It takes one of
two forms. Traditionally, a woman is paid to be inseminated with the sperm of the
man who pays her. The woman agrees to gestate and birth the fetus and to terminate
her parental rights to the resulting child in favor of the man who paid her and some
times his wife. In this form of contract pregnancy, the birth mother is the genetic
mother of the resulting child. In the second form of contract pregnancy, "gestational
surrogacy," a woman is paid to be inseminated with the embryo of a contracting
couple, who have already had their sperm and ova joined in vitro. In this form of
contract pregnancy, the resulting child is not genetically related to its birth mother.
Nevertheless, I would argue that the child born to a "gestational" mother has two
biological mothers: her birth mother and her genetic mother. But seeJohnson v. Cal
vert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (natural mother is gamete provider not birth mother).
In discussing issues regarding contract pregnancy, I choose not to use the customary
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respect for women's bodily integrity. Under choice rhetoric, a woman
chooses to use contraception, abort a pre-viable fetus, or use alterna
tive means of insemination based on her private circumstances. We
all say that women, because of their status as humans, must have au
thentic rights to bodily integrity if we, as women, are ever going to
obtain meaningful equality in our society. For example, most femi
nists have supported abortion in the terms of choice and bodily integ
rity, viewing any restriction regarding pre-viability access to abortion as
working against the goal of equality for women. I understand the im
portance of the theory and the rhetoric, and in large part, I believe it.
Because of the operation of patriarchy, women historically have not,
and currently have, little control over their physical selves. One exam
ple of this lack of control over our bodies is the fact that the law did
not recognize marital rape as a crime until relatively recently. 6 Le
gally, women's bodies were not their own. Legally, women's bodies
belonged to the men to whom they were legally attached.7 Women in
abusive relationships continue to learn that their bodies are not their
own, because the State has created so few mechanisms to enable wo
men to authentically maintain control over their bodies. 8 But given
the history of women's lack of control over our bodies, it is not sur
prising to any of us that "choice," choice with regard to what we do
with our bodies, has become central to the feminist discussion of re
productive rights.
There are other reasons why "choice" has become such an impor
tant political and rhetorical tool for North American feminists.
Choice is an important part of classic liberalism - which assumes that
all citizens have a zone of liberty in which to make intimate decisions. 9
Choosing when or whether to have children has long been deemed
term for this technology because it explicitly labels the genetic mother, in the first
instance, and the birth mother, in the second instance, as not the resulting child's
"real" mother. Such a construction denigrates the work of pregnancy, as well as the
emotional bonds women often form with the developing fetuses they carry.
6. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 45, 49 (1990) (In the 1980s, a handful of state judges held
or opined in dicta that the marital rape exception constituted a denial of married
women's constitutional right to equal protection.). See also MARY LYNDON SHANLEY,
FEMINISM, MAfuuAGE, AND THE LAw IN V1croRIAN ENGLAND, 156-88, 1850-95 (1989)
(examining the social and legal structures supporting battering and rape in late nine
teenth century England).
7. CJ. West, supra note 6, at 71 ("The marital rape exemption creates, fosters, and
encourages ... a separate state of sovereignty ungoverned by law and insulated from
state interference.").
8. R. EMERsoN DoBASH AND RussELL P. DoBASH, WoMEN, VIOLENCE AND SoCIAL
CHANGE (1992) (examining legal and social structures supporting the battering of
women in the United States); see also Marie Fox, Legal Responses to Battered Women who
Kill, in LAw AND BODY PoIITics: REGUIATING THE FEMALE BoDY ijo Bridgeman and
Susan Millins eds., 1995) 171-200 (examining the adequacy of the response of the
British justice system to battered women who kill their abusers).
9. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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part of this liberty. 10 The newer reproductive technologies seem to
expand our vision of what liberty and choice mean. With technology,
reproductive liberty can become not only the right to have or not to
have a child, but the right to have a child by any technologically avail
able means.II As Janet Dolgin noted: "reproductive technology, sim
ply by unfolding, invites human beings to become increasingly
autonomous, and to enter into a range of contracts that may prove
unlimited. It thus invites, and values, choice. "I 2 As a result, it also
values the principles of classic liberalism, which values autonomy with
out reference to the effects that the exercise of autonomy has on
others, and without reference to the conditions under which choices
are made.I3 So even though the political and rhetorical utility of
choice is problematic, choice has nevertheless been an important part
of our feminist fight for the control of our bodies.
Because reproductive rights for women are so tenuous and are
increasingly more vulnerable,I4 it has been difficult for feminists to
seriously discuss the wisdom of the "choice" rhetoric we use when dis
cussing access to abortion or access to any of the new emerging repro
ductive technologies.I5 I have been thinking about this issue,
specifically with regard to feminist responses to sex-selective abor
tion. I6 For example, although feminist ethicist Tabitha Powledge un
derstands that in the context of sex-selection of children, to prefer
males is unavoidably to denigrate females,I 7 she nevertheless takes the
10. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation is a funda
mental right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception is a fundamen
tal right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion of non-viable fetus is a
fundamental right); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (right to abortion is a liberty interest) (O'Connor, Kennedy
& Souter,JJ.).
11. See, e.g., John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pref!>
narwy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 410 (1983).
12. Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" ofReproduction: Reproductive Technologies and the
Parent-child Bond, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1261, 1272 (1994).
13. Cf. SPALLONE, supra note 4, at 81 ("[W)e similarly hear the argument that
women should have the 'free' choice to become 'surrogates' if we wanted. But what
does that mean? One swvey showed that 40 percent of women who became 'surro
gate' mothers were unemployed or on welfare.").
14. See generally, Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (decreasing the standard of review of reg
ulations restricting abortion to an "undue burden" review).
15. Tabitha Powledge, Toward A Moral Policy for Sex Choice, in SEX SELECTION OF
CHU..DREN 201, 207 (Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983).
16. See April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex Selective Abortion: Sol.ely a
Matter of Choice?, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 161 (1996). For other approaches to the issue
of sex-selection and the law, see Jodi Danis, Sexism and "the Superfluous Female": ATgU
ments for Regulating Pre-Implantation Sex Sel.ection, 18 HARv. WoMEN's LJ. 219 (1995);
Owen Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination ofa Child's
Gender, 6 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1992); George Schedler, Benign Sex Discrimination Re
visited: Constitutional and Moral Issues in Banning Sex-Sel.ection Abortion, 15 !'EPP. L. REv.
295 (1988).
17. Powledge, supra note 15, at 207.
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position vis-a-vis sex-selection, that in order to protect the improve
ments women have already achieved, "society should seek no legal re
strictions on reproductive freedom, even on a technology that will be
used selectively against females. " 18 Powledge says that although she
"recognize[s] its irony, [she] view[s] this position as part of the price
of furthering the goal of equal treatment." 19
The problem here is that our reliance on choice creates a situa
tion in which substantive outcomes are subordinated to process neu
trality. In other words, substantive equality is secondary to formal
equality, even though we know that formal equality has often allowed
deep substantive oppression and subordination to continue.2 For ex
ample, as Janice Raymond has noted, "[c]hoice resonates as a quintes
sential U.S. value, set in a context of a social history that has gradually
allowed all sorts of oppressive so-called options, such as prostitution
[and] pornography, ... to be defended in the name of women's right
to choose." 21 We allow people to make decisions, "choices," regard
less of the outcome. This classical liberal position protects individuals
from unwarranted government intrusion into decisions regarding the
private sphere, but it does not require nor does it encourage individu
als to behave in ways that further the interests of the community.22
The subordination of substantive outcomes to process neutrality (or
to choice) does not necessarily promote women's interests in equality.
Thus, by focusing on the process of whether bodily integrity and
choice are protected, we fail to pay close attention to the substantive
outcome - the abortion of female fetuses - or the denigration of
women as a social group.
So we have a dilemma - feminism has traditionally stressed the
importance of women's control over their bodies and reproductive
control in achieving social, political, and economic equality.23 Sex
selective abortion, like other "new" reproductive technologies, poses
challenges to this traditional feminist position. I think that the use of
newer reproductive technologies presents difficulties for traditional
feminist thought in this area because the effects of an individual wo
man's use of the technology goes beyond herself in ways that are po
tentially dangerous/negative, not just for the woman using the

°

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See CA.TIJARINE MAc'KINNoN, THE SEXUAL liARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979).
21. JANICE RAYMOND, WOMEN As WoMBS ix-x (1993).
22. The classic liberal legal tradition is keenly connected to the classic liberal
political tradition associated with the works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke,
which are committed to a formal or procedural conception ofjustice rather than a
conception of law in which substantive justice is deemed more or as significant. Karl
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins ofModern Legal Conscious
ness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 276-77 n.38 (1978).
23. RosALIND Pol.I.ACK. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WoMAN's CHOICE: THE STATE,
SEXUALTIY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 289-302 (1985).
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technology, but for women as a social group. In the case of sex-selec
tive abortion, and other reproductive technologies, "the paradox
posed by individual choices eventually alter[s] every woman's experi
ence of maternity and motherhood."24 Use of sex-selective pre-con
ception and post-conception techniques, for example, is the result of,
and becomes one of the causes of, the denigration of women. Boys
are chosen over girls because of what it means to be a girl in society.
Girls are devalued. 25 Sex-selective abortion also decreases the number
of women born. We know from research that in societies where men
greatly outnumber women, women are heavily restricted in both pri
vate and public activity. 26 In our analyses of the newer reproductive
technologies, we need to remain cognizant that the technical means
heralded as liberating women's choice are always limited by the social,
political, and economic forces that constrain women's "free choice."
RIGHTS AND RIGHTS-TALK

As a society, we often talk about rights as a solution for the ine
quality we face. I believe that this is true, particularly of those of us
who are members of historically and contemporarily oppressed and
vilified groups, such as African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, women of
all races and ethnic groups, lesbians and gay men, and poor people.
As critical race scholar Patricia Williams has explained regarding Afri
can-Americans: "For the historically disempowered, the conferring of
rights is symbolic of all of the denied aspects of their humanity: rights
imply a respect that places one in the referential range of self and
others, that elaborates one's status from human body to social be
ing."27 Furthermore, historically, the assertion of needs, in addition
24. Laura R Woliver, The Deflective Puwer ofReproductive Technologi£s: The Impact on
Women, 9 WOMEN AND POL. 17, 19-20 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Nancy E. Williamson, Boys or Girls? Parental Preference and Sex Contra~
33 POPULATION BuLL. 13-14 (1978) (sex preference reflects the roles that women and
men or boys and girls play in the society).
26. Women in societies with such unbalanced sex ratios suffer from substantial
constraints on their behavior, such as significant penalties for non-virginity before
state recognized marriage, proscriptions against adultery, extensive control by men
over their wives and daughters, and the marriage of girls and women at younger ages.
See MARCIA GUTrENTAG AND PAUL SECORD, Too MANY WoMEN? THE SEX RA.no QuEs
TION 79 (1983). Women in these societies are also endangered by female infanticide
and neglect, and by strong sex role ideologies, which socially and legally require wo
men to behave according to models of submission and subordination. See Susan
Greenhalgh and Jiali Li, Engendering Reproductive Policy and Practice in Peasant China:
For a Feminist Demography ofReproduction, 20 SIGNS: J. WoMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 601,
601 (1995). For a fuller analysis see Cherry, supra note 16, at 168-75.
27. PATRICIA]. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND R:rcHrS: DIARY OF A LAw PROFES
SOR 153 (1991). See also RAYMOND, supra note 21, at 192 (movement from body to
social being is also relevant in women's struggle for reproductive justice).
Feminist legal scholar Fran Olsen has also noted that "[a]s exhortation, the state
ment that women have rights is an assertion about the kind of society we want to live
in, the kind of relations among people we wish to foster, and the kind of behavior that
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to the assertion of rights, or in place of the assertion of rights, as advo
cated by critical legal studies scholars, has been unsuccessful for disen
franchised groups in our society. Again, Williams notes: "For blacks,
describing needs has been a dismal failure as political activity.... The
history of our need is certainly moving enough to have been called
poetry, oratory and epic entertainment, but it has never been treated
by white institutions as a statement of political priority."28
As a result of these observations, critical race theorists, as well as
other scholars of color, have encouraged the fight for rights. Rights,
they have found, serve a dual purpose. Rights "facilitate our access to
a variety oflegal norms and enforcement mechanisms by which we try
to indicate ... important claims, "29 and are useful "to mobilize sup
port for a particular agenda."30 As critical race theoristJohn Calmore
observes: "Until the subjugated group feels a sense of moral outrage,
the group will almost certainly fail to resist the injustice that is op
pressing it. "31 Feminist scholar Elizabeth Schneider has also noted
that rights talk can "provide a sense of self-hood and collective identity
and start a political conversation."32 For example, rights and rights
talk. have empowered women as a social group by giving some women
power, although limited, over whether and when they choose mother
hood. Rights discourse in this context served to foster political educa
tion and organization.33 As a result, rights discourse was used to
facilitate justice.
Hence, rights and rights rhetoric can only be useful if they are
not separated from issues of social justice and other ethical concerns.
In the reproductive area, our focus on individual rights has sometimes
allowed us to neglect larger issues of social need and justice.
Many radical feminists are critical of rights-talk due to its justifica
tions of state power based on the enforcement of individual rights. 34
Rights and claims to rights are part of the patriarchal system of law
which is represented by the belief in the importance of "objectivity,
distance and abstraction. "35 As a result, rights-talk tends to delegi
is to be praised or blamed. The assertion that women have rights is a moral claim

about how human beings should act toward one another." Frances Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique ofRights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. RE.v. 387, 391 (1984). See also
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women '.s
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 611 (1986) (rights discourse can express human and
communal values).
28. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reccmstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. RE.v. 401, 412 (1987).
29. John 0. Galmore, Critical Race Theury, Archie Shepp and Fire Music Securing an
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 2129, 2211 (1992).
30. Id.
31. Id. (footnote omitted).
32. Schneider, supra note 27, at 623.
33. Id. at 622-23.
34. See, e.g., RAYMOND, supra note 21, at 191.
35. Schneider, supra note 27, at 597, 600; Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marx
ism, Method, and the State: TuwardFeminist]urisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CUI.TURE
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tunize women's experience of the world, such as their treatment
under the law governing reproductive technologies, and the impor
tance of women's material needs. 36 Rights-talk under patriarchy has
lead to the emergence of maternal-fetal conflicts in both medicine
and law, in which physicians and judges favor fetal interests over the
pregnant woman's non-consent or the pregnant woman's freedom. 37
Rights-talk has helped us get to a place where we discuss the rights of
the free floating fetus as though the fetus were not attached to a wo
man's womb. 38 "Sooner or later we have to expose rights-based per
spectives . . . for what they are (in part): a poorly disguised way of
preserving things just as they are."39
Even in light of the criticism placed on the value of rights in our
society, rights and rights discourse have been, and will continue to be,
useful to disenfranchised groups in our struggle for a just society.
Rights-talk speaks to the interpretive community. It speaks in the lan
guage of those who hold power.40 In order for any dissenting view to
be seriously considered in legal discourse, those in control must un
derstand the claims of the dispossessed and take those claims seri
ously. Nevertheless, rights discourse, as currently framed by
liberalism, merely permits reform. It will never allow the destruction
of patriarchy and hence will never allow the radical changes needed
to truly transform women's social and political status. Individual
rights are the "tools of a racist patriarchy," to use Audre Lorde's meta
& Soc'v 635, 655 (1983) (Law "not only reflects a society in which men rule women; it

rules in a male way.").
36. With respect of sexuality, Fran Olsen notes: "As an analytic tool, the concept
that women have rights seems powerful but in practice it turns out not to be helpful;
it cannot answer any difficult questions. [With regard to sexuality] [w] omen's right to
freedom of action conflicts with their right to security; their right to substantive equal
ity conflicts with their right to formal equality." Olsen, supra note 27, at 391. See also
Calmore, supra note 29, at 2215 ("Th[e] process whereby rights are defined by law,
however, is substantially isolated from the very needs that generated those rights and
the values they envisaged.").
37. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 11, at 437-64 (arguing for a legal preference
for fetal interests over maternal freedom during pregnancy, labor and delivery); Ra
leigh Fitkin v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (NJ. 1964) (fetus entitled to benefits of blood
transfusion despite pregnant woman's refusal);Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County
Hospital Authority, 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). See also I'ETCHESKY, supra note 23, at
352-53 (growing number of ob/gyn practitioners view the fetus' as their patient in
dependent of the woman who carries it). But see In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C.
1990) (en bane) (recognizing a pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity as against
the state's interest in protecting the fetus).
38. For a fuller analysis of this phenomenon see, e.g., I'ETCHESKY, supra note 23, at
334-35.
39. RAYMOND, supra note 21, at 191 (quoting Sherene Razack, "Wrong Rights: Femi
nism Applied to Law, 10 LE BuLLETIN I NEWSLETI'ER, lNSTITUT S™oNE DE BEAuvom 13
(1990)).
40. Cf. Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin ofPraperty, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 84-85,
88 (1985) (common law theory of possession gives preference to those who articulate
their intentions in a specific vocabulary and in a structure that is approved of and
understood by those in power).
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phor, and "will never dismantle the master's house."41 In order for
rights to be truly transformative, rights discourse must emphasize the
interdependence of autonomy and community, and be connected to
the struggle for social justice.42
CHOICE, RIGHTS, AND THE FUTURE OF FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT IN
THE AREA OF REPRODUCTION

So given the problematic nature of choice and rights rhetoric,
what do we do? In order to ethically support rights in the reproduc
tive arena, feminists must seek to ensure that the rights sought do not
create new forms of subordination for women of any race or class, or
for members of other subordinated groups. 43 Feminism must con
sider whether the right to choose any of the emerging reproductive
technologies increases women's reproductive freedom or increases
the exploitation of women's reproductive capacities. Feminism must
also consider the ways in which reproductive technologies will affect
the value or status of women in this gender-based society. Even many
feminists who have argued against the legal regulation of reproductive
technologies have recognized that the principle of freedom of choice
(liberty) must be second to the principles of social fairness and anti
subordination (substantive equality) if women's subordination is to be
reduced or eradicated.44 There must be a point at which the rights of
individual women impinge so strongly on women as a social group
that social or legal regulation is required.45 Therefore, if rights-talk is
to be a useful tool of fe~t discourse in this area, freedom of choice
must be weighed against the commitment to ending subordination.46
In the final analysis, rights discourse must include an understand
ing of the historical and contemporary injustices towards women, as
well as an understanding of women's social training in patriarchy
41. AUDRE LoRDE, The Master's Tools will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SIS
OursmER 110-13 (1984).
42. See Schneider, supra note 27, at 611.
43. Cf. MariJ. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 1763, 1771 (1990).
44. See, e.g., Powledge, supra note 15; Roberta Steinbacher & Helen B. Holmes,
Sex Choice: Suruival and Sisterhood, in MAN-MADE WoMEN 52, 61 (Gena Corea et. al.
eds., 1987).
45. See Robyn Rowland, Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of
'Choice' in Sex Preselection, in MAN-MADE WoMEN, supra note 44, at 74, 84.
46. Several feminist and critical race scholars have stressed the importance of an
anti-subordination principle in the quest for equality, and in their critique of liberal
rights-talk. See, e.g., CATHARINE A MAcK!NNoN, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 215-34 (1989); Robin West, supra note 6; MariJ. Matsuda, Affirmative Action and
Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in P/.owed Up Ground, 11 HARv. WoMEN's LJ. 1 (1988);
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1003 (1986).
TER
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which often requires women to collude with patriarchy to our own
disadvantage. 47 As Rosalind Petchesky has stated:
The "right to choose" means ve:ry little when women are powerless
.... Women make their own reproductive choices, but they do not
make them just as they please; they do not make them under condi
tions which they themselves create, but under social conditions and
constraints which they, as mere individuals, are powerless to
change. 48

Hence, when considering issues of substantive justice and their con
nection to ethical considerations, we must consider whether rights
talk fully considers the social, economic and political contexts in
which women make "choices" concerning the abortion of gendered
(female) fetuses.
CONCLUSION

Many reproductive rights, such as the right to buy and use contra
ception and the right to choose abortion, gave women with economic
resources power and control over their lives. These rights allowed wo
men to choose more freely, to decide whether and when to have chil
dren. Women with financial resources no longer had to continue
unplanned pregnancies or have back-alley abortions. 49 These rights
emphasized the interdependence of individual liberty and communal
justice. Giving women the choice to continue or terminate a preg
nancy was a choice which had the potential to destroy male control of
women's sexuality and reproductive lives.
Sex-selective abortion, however, is different because its conse
quences do not result in the dismantling of patriarchal domination.
We have seen that the overwhelming majority of women who make
choices regarding sex-selective abortion make the choice to destroy
the female fetus. 50 Thus, while abortion gives women control over
47. For example, through personal service (homemaking), sexual service (per
forming intercourse and having children), and ego service (encouragement and at
tention) to men, women expend much of their creative energies and limit their own
career and creative choices. See MARILYN FRYE, Dppressicn, in THE PoLrTics OF REAI.rIY:
EssAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 9 (1983); and ADRIENNE RICH, OF WoMAN BoRN: MoTIIER
HOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 279-80 (1976).
48. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Reproductive Freedom: Beyond "a Woman '.s Right to
Choose," 5 SIGNS: J. WoMEN IN CULTURE & Sec'y 661, 674-5, (1980) (quoting KARL
MARx, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LouIS BoNAPARTE 15 (1963)).
49. Because of the severe limitations on federal funding for abortion, many poor
women have been forced to continue unplanned pregnancies or have abortions per
formed by unlicensed providers. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Hyde
Amendment, which restricts federal funding for most abortions for poor women, held
constitutional).
50. For example, a joint committee of the Indian Parliament found that during
the period of 1986-87, as many as 50,000 female fetuses were aborted after sex identi
fication tests were performed. Ajoy Bose, Abortion: Who Belieues in a Woman's Right to
Choose?, GUARDIAN FEATURES, Aug. 11, 1992, at 15.
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whether and when to have children, sex-selective abortion gives fami
lies5I control over the sexual composition of future generations. Sex
selective abortion increases the opportunities for gender discrimina
tion. s2 Instead of reducing the subordination ofwomen and girls, sex
selective abortion increases women's social, economic, political and
reproductive exploitation.

51. Much of the medical literature discusses the ethical use of the new reproduc
tive technologies in terms of the impact on "couples" and the impact on society,
thereby exhibiting an explicit understanding that the decision of whether to use a
new reproductive technology is not based on the woman's interest in reproduction.
See, e.g., THE Ennes CoMMITrEE OF THE AMERICAN FERTILrIY SoCIETY, EnnCAL CoNsm
ERATIONS OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1986); MARY WARNOCK, A QuES
TION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN F'ERTil.ISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY

(1984).
52. See generally Cheny, supra note 16.
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